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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Thus there seem to be two definite rules for the determination of the
value of condemned land. When it appears certain that the land will be
included in the improvement, no increment is allowed. Where it appears
with reasonable certainty that the land will not be taken, increment will
be allowed. The principal case falls in the middle ground between the two
rules. Whether it would be taken or not depended from the first upon which
of two alternative routes should be chosen, and no one could have known
whether it would or would not be taken. The Supreme Court solved the
dilemma by denying any increment of value where it appears possible that
the land will be taken. E. MA. C.
NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-FAILURE TO PRESENT CHECK-PAYMENT OF
TAXES BY CHEcK-[Missouri].-On November 4, 1932 the plaintiff gave
defendant, the state Collector of Revenue, as payee, a check in payment of
state and county taxes. About an hour and a half later defendant de-
posited it in the bank which was his regular depository. The drawee bank,
which was in the same town, was open on November 4 and on November 5,
1932, until 3:00 P. M.; but it was closed for liquidation before the begin-
ning of the next business day and before the check was presented for pay-
ment. After the drawee bank closed, the defendant charged back on the tax
records the taxes for which he had given the plaintiff a receipt on November
4, 1932. In October, 1937, the plaintiff paid the taxes to the then Collector
of Revenue, and brought this action to recover the amount of his loss caused
by the alleged negligence of the defendant in failing to present the check
before the drawee bank closed. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the
trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held, affirmed. The de-
fendant was not negligent; and the negotiable instruments' rule dicharging
the drawer pro tanto for the payee's delay in presenting a check for pay-
ment does not apply when the check is given in payment of taxes and when
suit is by the drawer instead of by the payee. Beckman v. Kinder.,
In a suit by the payee against the drawer of a check given for a private
debt instead of for taxes, but otherwise involving facts similar to those of
the principal case, the loss due to delay in presentment must be borne by
the payee-plaintiff. 2 The rules governing such a situation are those of the
1. (Mo. 1942) 165 S. W. (2d) 311.
2. "A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time
after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the
extent of the loss caused by the delay." R. S. Mo. 1939 §3201, Negotiable
Instruments Law, §186. When the bank and the payee are in the same town,
it is generally recognized that a "reasonable time" means before the end of
the next business day after the payee has received the check. St. John v.
Homans (1844) 8 Mo. 382; Wear v. Lee (1885) 87 Mo. 358; Rosenblatt v.
Haberman (1880) 8 Mo. App. 486; Koch v. Sanford Loan & Realty Com-
pany (1926) 220 Mo. App. 396, 286 S. W. 732; Missouri Pacific Railroad,
Company v. H. M. Brown Coal Company (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1038, 48.
S. W. (2d) 86; Farm and Home Savings and Loan Association v. Stubbs
1936) 231 Mo. App. 87, 98 S. W. (2d) 320. Accord: Maxwell v. Dunhax
1927) 222 Mo. App. 193, 297 S. W. 94. Brady, Bank Checks (2d ed. 1926)
135, §87; 8 Am. Jur., Bills and Notes, §670, and cases there cited. The
Missouri courts hold that the custom of banks in doing business through a
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law merchant and have no application as such in tort,3 although this dis-
tinction is not always clearly indicated by the decisions.4
While a seemingly similar factual situation is encountered when a check
is given in payment of taxes, the legal questions involved differ. Statutes in
many states, including Missouri, provide that taxes shall be paid only in
"gold or silver coin or legal tender notes of the United States, or in national
bank notes." S There are no Missouri decisions directly in point, but cases in
other states uniformly hold that in no event is a check for 'taxes itself more
than conditional payment, even where a receipt is given the taxpayer.6 Nor
would long condoned custom override the express instruction of the
"principal-state" to the "agent-collector," since by reason of the statute and
the presumption that everyone knows the law, the "third party-taxpayer"
clearing house does not extend the time in which presentment may be made.
Rosenblatt v. Haberman (1880) 8 Mo. App. 486; Farm and Home Savings
and Loan Association v. Stubbs (1936) 231 Mo. App. 87, 98 S. W. (2d) 320.
But some other states follow a more liberal rule. Brady, Bank Checks, (2d
ed. 1926) 143, §90; 8 Am. Jur., Bills and Notes, §670, and cases there cited.
The drawer is discharged both on the check and on the original considera-
tion. Bigelow, Bills, Notes, and Checks (3d ed. 1928) 160, note 2. It is
immaterial that some of these rules were announced in cases decided before
the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, since, in Missouri at least,
this section has not changed the previously existing law on the subject.
Farm and Home Savings and Loan Association v. Stubbs (1936) 231 Mo.
App. 87, 98 S. W. (2d) 320; Bigelow, Bills, Notes, and Checks (3d ed.
1928) 163, §230.
3. Smith, Compendium of Mercantile Law (3d ed. 1865) 318.
4. "Could it be said that in such case he was not negligent? * * by
his own forgetfulness, his own negligence delayed presentation." [Italics
added] Koch v. Sanford Loan & Realty Company (1926) 220 Mo. App. 396,
400, 286 S. W. 732, 733.
"It is also generally recognized that when the holder of a check and the
bank on which it is drawn are in the same city or town, the check must be
presented on the day it is received or the next day thereafter, and if not so
presented the holder will be guilty of negligence as a matter of law."
fltalics added] Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. H. M. Brown Coal
Company (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1038, 1040, 48 S. W. (2d) 86, 87. The
-plaintiff in the principal case relied heavily upon the language of the latter
case in his briefs.
5. R. S. Mo. 1939 §11082.
6. Koones v. The District of Columbia (1886) 4 Mackey (15 D. C.) 339,
54 Am. Rep. 278; Gray v. Boundary County (1930) 49 Idaho 589, 290 Pac.
399; Morgan v. Gilbert (1929) 207 Iowa 725, 223 N. W. 483; Beloit Building
Company v. Staley (1925) 118 Kan. 141, 234 Pac. 57; Houghton v. City of
Boston (1893) 159 Mass. 138, 34 N. E. 93; Moore v. Auditor General (1900)
122 Mich. 599, 81 N. W. 561; Morit2 v. Nicholson (1926) 141 Miss. 531,
106 So. 762; McLanahan v. City of Syracuse (N. Y. Sup. 1879) 18 Hun.
259; Eggleston v. Plowman (1926) 49 S. D. 609, 207 N. W. 981, 44 A. L. R.
1231.
Any contrary agreement, express or implied, between the tax collector
and the taxpayer will not affect the rights of the state. Houghton v. City
of Boston (1893) 159 Mass. 138, 34 N. E. 93; McLanahan v. City of Syra-
cuse (N. Y. Sup. 1879) 18 Hun. 259; Beloit Building Company v. Staley
(1925) 118 Kan. 141, 234 Pac. 57.
But the taxes for which a check was given will be paid when the money
is actually received on the check. Richards v. Hatfield (1894) 40 Neb. 879,
59 N. W. 777.
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has notice of the principal's "instructions." The result is that where a loss
is caused by the collector's delay in presenting a check given him for taxes,
the ordinary law of negotiable instruments does not apply; and the drawer
will have no pro tanto defense against subsequent proceedings by the state
to collect the taxes.
When the drawer of a check given in payment of a private debt is
entitled to be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of his loss by
the holder's failure to make due presentment, and he nevertheless pays the
amount of the debt on demand by the holder, the drawer's ability to recover
the payment will depend on whether the payment was made under a mis-
take of fact or law.7 Under the American decisions, it would seem that
when with full knowledge of the facts relieving him of liability, the drawer
pays the holder under a misapprehension of the law, his payment is volun-
tary, even though made under protest, and cannot be recovered. 8 But, on
the other hand, if the money is paid under a mistaken supposition that
proper presentment has been made, 9 the drawer may recover.'0
7. The quasi-contract rules governing the recovery of money erroneously
paid generally allow recovery when the mistake is one of fact, but deny
recovery where the mistake is one of law. See Woodward, The Law ofQuasi Contracts (1st ed. 1913) 54-72, §§35-71. Most of the cases involving
checks appear to follow this distinction. However, at least one early case
seems to hold that a misapprehension of his legal liability will prevent a
drawer's subsequent promise to pay from being enforceable, and even that
money paid might be recovered. Chatfield v. Paxton (1798) 2 East 471 n,
102 Eng. Rep. 449 n. But such a view evidently gained no following. See
Chitty, Bills (10th Am. ed. 1842) 502 n. And Chitty stated as settled law
that "money paid by one knowing (or having the means of such knowledge
in his power) all the circumstances, cannot, unless there has been deceit or
fraud on the part of the holder be recovered back again on account of such
payment having been made under an ignorance of the law." Chitty, Bills(10th Am. ed. 1842) 502. Apparently only one American decision follows
the earlier English case, and this is not a clear holding. Ray & Thornton
v. The Bank of Kentucky (1843) 3 B. Mon. (42 Ky.) 510. The court in this
case said, "When money has been paid under a clear and palpable mistake
of either law or fact, essentially bearing upon and affecting the contract,
without cause or consideration, and which in law, honor, or conscience was
not due and payable, it may be recovered back." But there was evidence
from which the jury might on the new trial find mistake of fact on the
part of the plaintiff, so that the part of the above statement relating to
mistake of law would in such event be dictum.
8. Harvey v. Girard National Bank (1888) 119 Pa. St. 212, 13 Atl. 202;
Oil-Well Supply Co., Ltd. v. Exchange National Bank (1890) 131 Pa. St.
100, 18 Atl. 935 (payment after failure to make due presentment). Weil v.
Corn Exchange Bank (1909) 63 Misc. 300, 116 N. Y. S. 665, Aff'd 135 App.
Div. 915, 119 N. Y. S. 1149; Keazer v. Colebrook National Bank (1909) 75
N. H. 278, 73 Atl. 170 (payment after inadequate notice of dishonor);
Coburn v. Neal (1901) 94 Me. 541, 48 Atl. 178 (payment of part of forged
check).
9. Since under §186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law "a check must
be presented within a reasonable time after its issue," when the payee and
the drawee bank are in the same town, it might well be contended that any
given time the drawer ought to know whether the payee is at fault, that is,
whether it is before or after the end of the next business day. But cf.
Bigelow, Bills, Notes, and Checks (3d ed. 1928) 267-270, §§353-355, where
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But inasmuch as the taxpayer is bound to pay his taxes regardless of the
collector's delay or negligence, the foregoing rules cannot properly be ap-
plied to bar any action the taxpayer-drawer may have against the collector-
payee for personal negligence in presenting the check. Such an action
should be brought against the collector as a private individual rather than
as an official of the state, since acceptance of checks as final payment is
not within the power of a tax collector.11 When the collector does accept a
check, he personally becomes at least the gratuitous agent of the drawer,12
and the taxpayer's action for his failure to exercise reasonable care and
diligence is based upon negligence rather than upon mere failure to make
presentment as required by the Negotiable Instruments Law. 8
While some dicta are found,- there appear to be but three prior de-
cisions on the precise point involved in the principal case. One of these,15
a Missouri case, was dismissed for failure of proof, but contains a dictum
he raises the question of a possible conflict between §71 and §186 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
10. Martin v. Home Bank (1898) 30 App. Div. 498, 52 N. Y. S. 464,
54 N. E. 717. When, however, the drawer only promises to pay the check,
or pays only a part thereof, the payee cannot recover the remainder or the
amount promised, whether the agreement be founded on mistake of fact or
mistake of law. Neal v. Coburn (1898) 92 Me. 139, 42 Atl. 348. This is
perhaps contrary to the earlier rule, for according to Chitty, "In some of
the cases * * * the effect of such partial payment, or promise to pay, (by
the indorser or drawer) * * * has been considered not merely as a waiver
of the right to object to the laches, but even as an admission that the bill
or note had in fact been regularly presented and protested, and that due
notice of dishonor had been given; and this even in cases where the party
who paid or promised, afterwards stated that in fact he had not had due
notice, &c.; because it is to be inferred, that the part-payment or promise
to pay would not have been made, unless all the circumstances had con-
curred to subject the party to liability and induce him to make such pay-
ment or promise." Chitty, Bills (10th Am. ed. 1842) 501. Insofar as the
court bases its decision in the principal case upon the fact that suit was
brought by the drawer instead of by the payee, it is saying that because
the drawer subsequently paid the check (whether under mistake of fact or
law), he was not in the first instance, before he paid the check, entitled to
be discharged by the operation of a negotiable instruments rule, but only
by the payee's negligence. On principle, and in the light of the Martin v.
Home Bank case and the cases cited in footnote 8, supra, this does not
appear to be a sound basis for the decision.
11. Weidler v. Arizona Power Co. (1932) 39 Ariz. 390, 7 Pac. (2d) 241;
Sunflower Compress Co. v. Clark (1933) 165 Miss. 219, 145 So. 617. But
cf. Kansas Amusement Co. v. Eddy (1936) 143 Kan. 988, 57 P. (2d) 458,
105 A. L. R. 702.
12. Sunflower Compress Co. v. Clark (1933) 165 Miss. 219, 145 So. 617.
Accord: Morgan v. Gilbert (1929) 207 Iowa 725, 223 N. W. 483.
13. Banfleld v. Addington (1932) 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893; 2 Am. Jur.,
Agency, §§274, 276. The plaintiff in the principal cases apparently recog-
'nized the necessity of proving negligence on the part of the defendant, but
relied upon the defendant's failure to make due presentment to prove
negligence. Cf. footnote 4, supra.
14. Houghton v. City of Boston (1893) 159 Mass. 138, 34 N. E. 93.
15. Chouteau v. Rowse (1874) 56 Mo. 65.
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that the collector is liable for failure to make due presentment.,- The
other two cases'1 hold the collector liable on the ground of negligence,
irrespective of the rules of the Negotiable Instruments Law; and one of
these' s expressly denies that liability of the collector is founded on the
statute embodying the requirement of due presentment.
Thus the theory of the action and the proof required of a drawer when
he is attempting to recover from a tax collector differs considerably from
the theory and the proof required to successfully defend himself in an
action brought by a private payee against the drawer. In the latter case it
is necessary to prove only that presentment was not made within the
prescribed time. But in the former situation, the drawer must prove lack
of ordinary care on the part of the payee, and this will vary with the
circumstances of the particular situation, and will not necessarily coincide
with due presentment under statute.
In the principal case, it was clear that the collector had not made due
presentment; but under the particular facts involved, the plaintiff could
not show that the defendant had not exercised at least ordinary care. The
collector deposited the check within an hour and a half after he received it,
a practice which had theretofore proved satisfactory; and he had no knowl-
edge from which he should have known that it would not be satisfactory in
this one instance. As the court pointed out,' 9 to require the defendant to do
more than he did would be to require extraordinary care. While no point
was made of this in the opinion, neither would the defendant collector
appear to have been negligent in his selection of the depository bank as the
channel for presenting the plaintiff's check for payment.
Any negligence in the case would seem to have been on the part of the
depository bank. The defendant deposited the check on November 4, and
although the drawee bank, located in the same town, was open until 3:00
P. M. the next day, the depository bank failed to present the check before
the drawee bank closed. The plaintiff would seem to have had a better cause
of action founded on negligence against the bank than against the collector.
F. D. S.
16. However, the defendant delayed nearly a month in presenting the
check, and it might well have been found that he was negligent.
17. Palm Court Corporation v. Smith (1931) 103 Fla. 233, 137 So. 234
(defendant had not presented check when bank closed five days after he
received it); Sunflower Compress Co. v. Clark (1933) 165 Miss. 219, 145
So. 617 (defendant had not presented check when bank closed four days
after he received it).
18. Sunflower Compress Co. v. Clark (1933) 165 Miss. 219, 232, 145 So.
617, 618.
19. Beckman v. Kinder (Mo. 1942) 165 S. W. (2d) 311, 315.
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